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To what extent is a handler morally and legally responsible for the results of his agent’s 
actions as a human intelligence source? This article addresses responsibility towards a 
person (accountability) rather than for a specific event (attribution). Handling is a type of 
cooperation, which requires that cooperating persons make concessions regarding 
preferences either voluntarily or under coercion. This article, therefore, analyzes 
cooperation in terms of control over the preferences of another person. It offers a link 
between control and responsibility following the free-will paradigm, arguing that one 
exceptional characteristic of handling is the level of control the handler exercises over the 
agent. This control is unique in that it combines both coercive and voluntary grounds. In 
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standard cooperative relationships, these sources of control are typically exclusive to one 
another, so a person is either willing or coerced to cooperate. This article shows that in 
handling, the two sources of control co-exist uniquely. As control is exceptionally potent 
in handling, this paper argues for a broad range of accountability towards agents by their 
handlers, who represent the employing state’s responsibility. As control is a marker of 
responsibility, gaining and losing control serve as indications for ascribing and waiving 
responsibility. The control-based approach can assist in determining the scope of 
responsibility towards an agent in typical handling patterns. It also assists in tackling 
theoretical issues concerning the defense of the Execution of Public Duty and the 
theoretical concept of Role Distance, showing that their rationale, in fact, signals when 
control over the relations is in force or absent. As this article seeks to study the general 
link between relationships of control and moral and legal responsibility in cooperative 
relations, its conclusions will be, therefore, relevant to other cooperative human 
interactions and their patterns of control. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
To what extent is a handler morally and legally responsible for the actions of an agent 
as a human intelligence asset and their consequences? The practice of gathering intelligence 
from human sources is both old and broad. The question of the handler’s responsibility seems 
curiously neglected by scholars. Simple answers that depend on a notion of contract between 
handler and agent are insufficient.1 Even if we accept the view that the handler-agent 
relationship is some form of contractual relation, their contracts are typically silent on the scope 
and division of responsibility for the operation’s consequences.2 
Though focused, this question requires consideration of a large number of issues. Of 
what kind of responsibility do we speak? Why should the handler be held responsible for the 
 
1 See generally Raphael Bitton, Intelligence Agents, Autonomous Slaves and the US Supreme Court's Wrong (and 
Right) Concept of Personal Autonomy, 7 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 4 (2014). But see Totten v. United States, 92 US 105 
(1875) 105; Tenet v. Doe, 544 US 1 (2005) (expressing the contractual view on handler-agent relationship).  
2 The case of Goung offers an exception. Goung v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1988). While working for 
US Intelligence in Vietnam, the CIA promised Goung that if caught, the CIA would rescue him. He also argued that 
his handlers pledged to take care of his family. Goung maintains that the CIA broke both promises. Based on the 
Tennet and Totten rules, Goung could not even file his contractual claim in court. In contrast, one other potential 
normative source of responsibility may be statutory. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there is a mandatory 
statutory duty for the handler to secure the agent’s welfare and security. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 
2000 § 29(4A)(a). 
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agent’s actions? What is the moral basis for ascribing responsibility to the handler? Handler-
agent relations are a particular example of cooperative ties.3 Although the case of handling an 
agent is extreme and unique, its moral and legal analysis touches surprisingly on issues that are 
universal and relevant to other patterns of cooperation. 
Consider agent A operated by handler H. H recruited A from within the ranks of an 
adversary army.4 Since recruitment, H clandestinely handles A as an agent, namely as a source 
of human intelligence. H sends A on an ambitious and dangerous mission. A subsequently is 
apprehended by the adversary’s counterintelligence services. His captors interrogate him 
violently and prosecute him for espionage. Eventually, the court sentences A to 20 years in 
harsh prison conditions. As A sits in his prison cell, he calculates the damages he suffers due to 
his services as an agent. He holds H, the intelligence organization employing him, and the 
organization’s state responsible for his release. If A’s family is in danger due to his exposure, A 
probably expects protection and/or rescue by said state. Moreover, he believes H and his state 
are responsible for harms he endured, including his torture, bodily harm, time in prison, loss of 
income, implications for his future welfare, and harm to his family. Is H responsible for the 
unfortunate results of handling A in the sense that A expects? 
Twenty years later, his captors release A from prison. He then hears that H, who retired 
as a high-ranking intelligence officer, is about to be appointed Minister of Defense in his 
country, A files a petition, arguing that H is responsible for overly risky handling, and therefore 
 
3 See generally Human Intelligence Collector Operations, DEP’T OF THE ARMY (Sept. 2006), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf. 
4 This article refers to agents recruited from the ranks or population of the adversary. I do not refer to recruitment 
and handling that take place through law enforcement. There are many similarities between handling agents drawn 
from both external and internal contexts. Some of the moral analysis that this article proposes may be relevant to 
handling agents in law enforcement, but there are also moral and legal differences. These differences justify tackling 
the question of responsibility for handling in law enforcement in a separate work. On the difference between foreign 
and domestic intelligence, see generally RICHARD A POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE US INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN 
THE THROES OF REFORM (Rowman & Littlefield 2006). 
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H is responsible for the harm and losses he suffered. As a result, A argues that H cannot and 
should not be promoted. Is H responsible for A’s handling in this sense as well? These 
questions of responsibility demand both moral and legal discussions. This paper seeks to 
establish a basis for the moral analysis of these neglected questions to provide a basis for legal 
doctrine. 
The agent may consider the handler responsible for his suffering, as the handler’s 
actions brought it about. This claim of responsibility is argued in terms of attribution.5 The 
agent may also claim that the handler or employing state is responsible for his wellbeing should 
any tangible, financial, or mental harm result from his activity. This claim of responsibility is 
argued in terms of accountability.6 In other words, the responsible entity should remedy the 
harm for which it is responsible and face broader consequences for the event for which it is 
held accountable. 7  These claims are linked, but do not necessarily overlap. Typically, one is 
accountable for the undesired result of X, because we attribute X to him.8 However, in some 
cases, one can be held accountable for events for which one isn’t responsible.9 One may even 
be held accountable for an event that is not attributed to him.10  
This paper seeks to frame a concept of responsibility for the consequences of handling. 
Responsibility for these consequences, however, must be determined in tandem with the issue 
 
5 For the definition of responsibility as attribution and accountability, see Gary Watson, Two Faces of 
Responsibility, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 227 (1996). 
6 Id. 
7 A good example would be the complaints of Jonathan Pollard against his handlers, mainly Raphael Eitan. Pollard 
even petitioned against Eitan’s appointment as minister, arguing that his responsibility for his situation required that 
he be denied such an appointment (HCJ 3648/06 Pollard v. Acting Prime Minister). 
8 See generally Daniel McGillis, Attribution and the Law, 2 L. AND HUM. BEHAV. 289, 290 (1978), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01038982. 
9 See, e.g., Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4 U.N.H.L. REV. 1, 3 (2005), 
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=unh_lr. 
10 For instance, a parent may feel accountable for a wrong action done by its adult son although the parent is not 
responsible for the outcomes of such action. An employer may be responsible for X caused by its employee 
regardless of x not being attributable to the employer. X, in this case, could be an event caused by the employee 
while the employer was not related or aware of X.  
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of causation.11  Some points will reference only responsibility for handling, without addressing 
different types of responsibility and its contexts. Rather, it merely positions the argument with 
regard to a more fundamental point. In a sense, this paper attempts to understand agent 
handling in a more profound sense that is relevant to most claims and types of responsibility. 
Such understanding is direly needed. Even in the rare cases that states admit to handling an 
agent and assume responsibility for that agent, the meaning and scope of the assumed 
responsibility is unclear.12 Although this paper explicitly addresses responsibility for handling 
an agent, handler-agent relations described here are merely case studies. Extreme cases of 
handling demonstrate the moral significance of control within cooperative relationships. Case 
studies of handler-agent relationships demonstrate different types of control relationships and 
sources of control.13 As this article addresses the typical handling of human intelligence 
sources, it seeks to study the general link between controlled relationships and forms of moral 
and legal responsibility. Its conclusions will be, therefore, relevant to other human interactions 
and its insights relevant to other patterns of control. 
The critical element in the moral analysis of responsibility for handling is the element 
of control. More precisely, it is the element of cooperation through the means of control. The 
handler and the agent generally maintain an asymmetrical cooperative relationship. They 
cooperate for the sake of gathering intelligence clandestinely. They may also cooperate in order 
to perform other undercover operations. They typically affiliate with adversarial parties. As the 
 
11 On the deep ties between moral responsibility for an outcome and causation, see Carolina Sartorio, Causation and 
Responsibility, 2 PHIL. COMPASS 749 (2007). 
12 See, for instance, Israel’s announcement admitting to handling Pollard in the US: “acknowledged that he was 
handled by high-ranking officials in a scientific relations bureau…In light of this fact, the State of Israel 
acknowledges its obligation to Mr. Pollard and is ready to accept full responsibility accordingly…”. Israel Admits It 
Spied on the US, BBC (May 12, 1998, 07:07 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/91260.stm. 
13 See Joseph A. Wippl, The Art of Agent Handling, 32 INT. J. INTEL. AND COUNTERINTEL., 781 (2019) (detailing 
how CIA handlers recruit and interact with agents).   
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agent typically comes from within the ranks of an adversary army, intelligence organization, or 
society, cooperating with the enemy seems irrational. Cooperation is nonetheless established. 
The compelling and morally relevant aspects of cooperation are its grounds. As terms of 
control define the dynamics of cooperation, its grounds are central to understanding moral 
responsibility for handling. Generally, in cooperative relationships, parties establish control 
based on two possible grounds. One is grounded in voluntary submission for a variety of 
possible interests; the other is grounded in coercive measures. Generally, these grounds of 
control are mutually exclusive. When one party establishes cooperation through voluntary 
control, coercion is unnecessary; when cooperation is coerced, it is, by definition, involuntary. 
However, handler-agent cooperation is unique in that both grounds of control often apply 
simultaneously. Handlers primarily control agents through compelling psychological ties. At 
the same time, potential threat of exposure by the handler hovers over the relationship. 
Control is a powerful marker of moral and legal responsibility.14 As a marker of 
responsibility, the element of control can help solve practical legal and moral issues related to 
responsibility for handling. The magnitude of control in handling relationships can indicate the 
magnitude of responsibility for the controlled agent’s actions and wellbeing and the 
consequences of the handling. Accordingly, events of loss of control can indicate the end of 
responsibility for the handling. 
It is essential to clarify that this article does not offer a comprehensive account of every 
 
14 In many cases, we intuitively link responsibility with free choice. And free choice, in turn, should be associated 
with control over one’s actions and preferences. Intuitively, a person cannot control his actions if he has only one 
available course of action. That is the case if one person controls the actions of another person. Parents, teachers, 
commanders, and leaders are all examples of people who exercise some level of control over other people. And they 
all accordingly bear some level of responsibility for the results of such cooperative relations. It is most important to 
mention Frankfurt’s opposing view. Frankfurt argues that the lack of an alternative course of action does not 
necessarily negate moral responsibility. Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. 
OF PHIL. 829, 829-833 (1969). 
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possible claim of responsibility concerning spying. For instance, it does not offer an account of 
responsibility for handling in response to a target state’s claim. When an espionage-based 
conflict between states arises, other legal and ethical concepts may become relevant, such as 
global justice and international law concepts. For instance, such relevant concepts may include 
the very legitimacy of spying among nations.15 They may even involve other legal concepts, 
such as the well-established legal custom that prohibits claims of the enemy.16 
Section II of this paper offers a deeper understanding of the unique practicalities of 
recruitment and handling.17 Section III offers an analysis of the notion of control and its links to 
moral and legal responsibility.18 Section IV presents an argument that sketches control as a 
means of cooperation.19 Section V suggests various scenarios in which issues of responsibility 
in handling are best analyzed and solved using the notion of control.20 Section VI concludes the 
article.21 
II. HANDER-AGENT RELATIONS 
Handler-agent relations are unique in almost every sense. They typically reflect 
cooperation between formal adversaries. As the handler wishes to gather information about 
the enemy through the agent, the best potential agent comes obviously from the adversary’s 
ranks. Targeted information may include details about the intentions, plans, capabilities, and 
condition of the adversary organization or state. The preferred human source for gathering 
 
15 See Raphael Bitton, The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1009 (2013); For a 
competing theory, see Asaf Lubin, The Liberty to Spy, 61 HARV. INT'L L. J. 185 (2020). 
16 For instance, a claim of an agent may be affected by the rule that courts do not hear claims made by the enemy or 
enemy nationals during a conflict. The agent himself may be an enemy national. However, once recruited and 
handled, he may not be treated as an enemy national for the sake of a responsibility-based claim. For instance, a 
different, although generally similar is the case of Dirani against the State of Israel. See Additional Hearing (Civil) 
5698/11 The State of Israel v. Mustafa Dirani (Hebrew).  
17 See infra § II. 
18 See infra § III. 
19 See infra § IV. 
20 See infra § V. 
21 See infra § VI. 
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such information is a soldier, an intelligence officer, a commander, or a political figure 
affiliated with an adversary. The more senior agents are in the ranks of the adversary, the 
better the information they can offer. The more willing the agents are, the more effective their 
handling. The inherent difficulty lies in the fact that the handler must recruit the agent from 
among the personnel most trusted by the adversary, but the adversary’s most trusted people 
are unlikely to cooperate with the enemy.22 
Recruiters and handlers depend on vulnerabilities in human nature. Some agents are 
recruited through exploiting mental instability.23 Others are recruited through identifying 
bitterness and grievance toward their own side.24 Others are swayed through sheer greed.25 
Some are recruited because their personal ideology deeply conflicts with beliefs and/or 
practices of their own side.26 Theoretically, recruitment can also be the result of coercion. 
However, despite conventional beliefs, most agents are not coerced during their recruitment 
phase.27 This makes sense as coerced agents are likely to be awful agents. Regardless of the 
 
22 Not all agents are recruited from within the ranks of the adversary. Some agents are neutral persons who happen 
to have access to some asset that an intelligence service needs. 
23 For a psychological analysis of typical agents, see Ursula M Wilder, The Psychology of Espionage, 61 STUD. IN 
INTEL. 19, 20 (2017). For empirical data suggesting a correlation between the tendency to become an agent and 
behavioral issues, see MARTIN F. WISKOFF & CHRISTOPHER C. FITZ, THE DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE'S ISSUE 
CASE DATA BASE: ANALYSIS OF ISSUE TYPES AND CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION (Def. Pers. Sec. Rsrch. and Educ. 
Ctr. 1991); SUZANNE WOOD & MARTIN F. WISKOFF, AMERICANS WHO SPIED AGAINST THEIR COUNTRY SINCE 
WORLD WAR II (Defense Personnel Security Research Center Monterey, CA. 1992). 
24 On disgruntlement as a motivation for recruitment, see Stan A. Taylor & Daniel Snow, Cold War Spies: Why They 
Spied and How They Got Caught, 12 INTEL. AND NAT’L SEC. 101, 107–08 (1997). This motive seems to be showing 
growing importance as time passes. 
25 The case of Aldrich Ames seems to match this pattern. US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 1 
November 1994, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ALDRICH H. AMES ESPIONAGE CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US 
INTELLIGENCE. Empirical data shows that as time passed from the 1950s to the 1960s, financial motivation became 
more common for agents that operated against the US. See WOOD & WISKOFF, supra note 23. 
26 On ideology as a motivation for agents, see Taylor & Snow, supra note 24, at 104–06. Ideology seems to be in 
decline as a significant motive. For a relatively recent case of ideology-based spying, see the case of Mordechai 
Vaanunu, a nuclear technician who exposed secret information on Israel’s alleged nuclear weapon program. Yoel 
Cohen, Vanunu, The Sunday Times, and the Dimona Question, 16 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 416, 431 (2010). 
27 Richards J. Heuer, Jr. & Katherine Herbig, Espionage by the Numbers: A Statistical Overview, DEFENSE 
PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 28, 2001), 
https://www.wrc.noaa.gov/wrso/security_guide/numbers.htm. 
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motive, recruitment commonly involves manipulation, deception, or fraud.28 In most of the 
non-coercive patterns, the agent will be handled based on consent.29 However, even the most 
willing agent cannot be deemed autonomous, even theoretically.30 In a cursory summary, one 
can say that designated agents may consent freely to recruitment, but once recruited, potential 
extortion hangs over the relationship with the handler. An agent is, therefore, in a position 
into which one may enter freely, but is rarely allowed to exit with a level of freedom 
sufficient to deem the agent autonomous.31 
Using personal vulnerabilities to identify and develop a competent agent requires a 
process. Subsequently, a handler needs to handle the agent. As an undercover agent is 
dispatched to undertake very complicated and risky tasks, the handler needs to address the 
agent’s safety and wellbeing. Simultaneously, the handler needs to gather high-quality 
intelligence and perform clandestine tasks through the agent. The handler must accomplish 
all this without alerting anyone in the agent’s surroundings and the adversary’s 
counterintelligence services. 32  The process of turning an adversary into a cooperative ally is 
emotionally and operationally complicated and the craft of handling requires special skills. 
The skills of the handler must indeed address the psychological and operational challenges of 
recruitment and handling. 
 
28 Take, for instance, the case of “false flag” handling. It is a method of handling an agent by deceiving the agent 
regarding the affiliation of the handler. This method can bypass some expected hostility by the designated agent. 
Fooled into believing that he works for another, and probably more favorable party, the agent may be more willing 
and motivated under this pattern of handling. Bitton, Intelligence Agents, supra note 1, at 10–11.  
29 See generally Heuer & Herbig, supra note 27. 
30 Bitton, Intelligence Agents, supra note 1. 
31 See generally Heuer & Herbig, supra note 27. 
32 See, for example, criticisms of the Israeli GSA concerning the handling of Avishai Raviv within the circles of 
right-wing extremists in the West Bank. In the course of handling, and for the sake of establishing Raviv’s 
reliability, the GSA allegedly initiated extreme and harmful actions. See Criminal Case 2070/99 State of Israel v. 
Avishai Raviv (Jerusalem, unpublished). Similarly, the Attorney General issued a detailed order, in which clear rules 
were given to the FBI on the limits of illegal activity of human sources. The order sets limits to authorizing unlawful 
activity in the course of developing agents’ reliability. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of 
FBI Confidential Human Sources (Dec. 2006), Ch. V §§ 1–10. 
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What does it mean to be psychologically skilled? In practice, it means to create the 
kind of trust and willingness on the part of the agent, so that he agrees to cooperate and to 
assume exceptional risk continuously. At the same time, the handler must maintain some 
level of authority, as the agent must not act in an uncontrolled manner. An uncontrolled agent 
might become reckless or negligent, which might prove deadly or result in lengthy prison 
time. An uncontrolled agent might also bring about operational failures. These might result in 
the loss of intelligence and the exposure of other agents, secret sources, and methods. If 
apprehended due to uncontrolled conduct, an agent might incite military or diplomatic 
tension. An uncontrolled agent could eventually feed his handler false information that might 
distort the intelligence picture. The conclusion is clear; the handler must maintain a sufficient 
level of authority over the agent. Authority is supposed to enable the successful completion 
of the agent’s missions and keep the agent safe and guard the secrecy of the mission. 
The role of the handler seems to involve an inherent contradiction that generates a 
unique moral condition. On one hand, the handler aspires to be the agent’s very committed 
and closest colleague. An agent might not continuously risk his life, liberty, and family for 
someone less meaningful. On the other hand, the handler cannot merely be the agent’s best 
friend. Handlers must maintain a high level of control for reasons of safety and efficiency. 
Friends, however, do not control one another. Therefore, the relationship must assume an 
irregular pattern in which the handler simultaneously maintains two contradictory types of 
relationships with another person.33 Namely, relations in which one is both close and 
authoritative vis a vis the same person. Parents and educators may face the same 
 
33 See, e.g., Agent Handlers, SECURITY SERVICE MI5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/agent-handlers (last visited 
April 19, 2021) (detailing that agent handlers need to have effective relationship building skills and are responsible 
for the safety of their assets). 
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contradicting requirements. Below, I show that this unique pattern of relationship is directly 
linked to the level of responsibility for an agent’s actions, safety, and wellbeing.34 
This unique psychological and practical pattern lies at the heart of the proposed moral 
analysis of handling, as focus on its uniqueness informs the question of moral responsibility. 
It is essential to note, however, that handler-agent relations entail other moral implications. 
These revolve mainly around the vast moral harm that results from handling.35 Understanding 
the harm that espionage entails relates to the issue of the handler’s responsibility. 
As with any morally questionable governmental activity, human espionage entails 
harmful and grave consequences.36 The scope of the harm is surprisingly broad. So is the 
number of people it affects. It includes the designated agents and the recruited agents. The 
handler uses the agent instrumentally, putting him at a considerable risk of imprisonment or 
death.37 The circle of harm further includes the agent’s family and close acquaintances. They 
share risk of punishment, arrest, interrogation, and social condemnation.38 If applied widely, 
HumInt activity may drag many into the circle of harm, even the targeted community as a 
whole, as it has the potential of destroying social ties of trust and solidarity.39 Unintuitively, 
 
34 See infra § III. 
35 On the moral harm resulting from handling agents, see Bitton, The Legitimacy of Spying, supra note 15, at 1010–
11; Ross Bellaby, What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection, 27 INTEL. AND NAT’L SEC. 93, 98-104 
(2012); John P Langan, Moral Damages and the Justification of Intelligence Collection from Human Sources, in 
ETHICS OF SPYING. A READER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL (Jan Goldman ed. 2006); David L Perry, " 
Repugnant Philosophy": Ethics, Espionage, and Covert Action, 15 J. OF CONFLICT STUD. 1, 19 (1995).  
36 See, e.g., Michael Kilian, CIA SAYS AMES EXPOSED HUNDREDS OF FOREIGN AGENTS, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 
1997), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-03-06-9703060164-story.html (detailing the extent of 
consequences to Soviet citizens as a result of Aldrich Ames’ espionage). 
37 CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, KANT: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AK: 4: 429 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2012) (“So act that you use your humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as means.”); Perry, supra note 35, at 229. 
38 On the horrible effect that running an agent can have on family and friends, even in a western democracy, Le 
Carre’s novel, A Perfect Spy, offers an extraordinary realistic account. JOHN LE CARRÉ, A PERFECT SPY: A NOVEL 
(Penguin 2011). 
39 History offers a few clear cases. McCarthyism, the Soviet purges, and the Palestinian hunt for collaborators are 
all shocking examples. On the history of Palestinian agents for the Israeli intelligence, see HILLEL COHEN, ARMY 
OF SHADOWS: PALESTINIAN COLLABORATION WITH ZIONISM 1917–1948 (U.C. Press 2009). On the Palestinian 
reaction to Israel’s successful HumInt collection, see YOSIF MAHMOUD HAJ-YAHIA, ALLEGED PALESTINIAN 
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handlers and their families also bear the burden of harm. Full-time work in an instrumental 
dirty-hands job can hardly leave a person unaffected emotionally.40 Even the recruiting state 
and its society bear part of the cost of human espionage. The employing government must 
verify that its officers never apply methods that they apply to adversaries within its 
government.41  These damages are all added to the direct economic cost of conducting such 
vast human activity. As the harm of handling agents becomes apparent, the relevance of 
responsibility similarly comes into focus. What is the handler/state’s part in the responsibility 
for the agent’s suffering and harm? The answer begins in an analysis of the moral meaning of 
control within cooperative relations. 
III. RELATIONS OF CONTROL 
A perfect agent, from the handler’s perspective, is fully controlled and serves as an 
extension of the handler within the target society or organization. The process of identifying a 
potential source and transforming him from an adversary into a collaborator is far from 
trivial.42 In many cases, the process will be gradual, so the agent proceeds through small steps, 
not fully aware of crossing the point of no return.43 Unless he eventually reaches a high level of 
 
COLLABORATORS WITH ISRAEL AND THEIR FAMILIES: A STUDY OF VICTIMS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE § 
12 (Harry S. Truman Rsrch. Inst. for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew 1999). By 1999, Haj-Yahia estimated that 
hundreds of Palestinian were killed by their own people based on suspected collaboration with Israel’s intelligence. 
For a combined historical and legal analysis of Palestinian reactions to the massive Israeli HumInt activity, see Ron 
Dudai & Hillel Cohen, Triangle of Betrayal: Collaborators and Transitional Justice in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, 6 J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 41 (2007). On the social impact of McCarthy’s activities, see RICHARD M. 
FRIED, THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE: NIGHTMARE IN RED 124 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990); ROBERT 
GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE 127-29 (Univ. of Mass. Press 1987); 
RICHARD GID POWERS, NOT WITHOUT HONOR: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM 271 (Yale Univ. 
Press 1998). 
40 On the potentially harmful effect to the handlers themselves and close circles, see Langan, supra note 35, at 112–
13. 
41 On the risks of the use of the methods of HumInt within the ranks of the employing government, see J. E. Drexel 
Godfrey, Ethics and Intelligence, in ETHICS OF SPYING: A READER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 8 (2006). 
42 Langan, supra note 35. 
43 MILES COPELAND, THE REAL SPY WORLD 127–28 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1974). 
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control, the agent cannot be deemed fully recruited and cannot be effectively handled.44  
A. The moral significance of control 
Control in handling affects two distinctive moral aspects of espionage. First, using 
human beings instrumentally, characteristic handler-agent relations raise the need for proper 
justification, something beyond the scope of the present article. Secondly, the characteristic 
control involved in handling agents and its uniqueness affects the moral consequences of such 
relations when they are deemed justifiable. Responsibility for handling refers to such 
consequences. 
In many cases, we intuitively link responsibility with free choice. Free choice, in turn, 
should be associated with control. When person A controls person B, A decides what B will do. 
In other words, when A controls B, A has the freedom to choose among alternatives for what B 
will do. Therefore, if B’s actions are a result of A’s free choice, it makes sense to view A as 
responsible for B’s actions and the consequences of these actions.45  The notion of control, 
therefore, is, in fact, a responsibility base. The controlling person is responsible for the 
consequences of the controlled person’s actions. 
Parents, teachers, commanders, and leaders are examples of people who exercise some 
control over others. Accordingly, we see controlling people as bearing some responsibility for 
those under their control.46 The free-will paradigm grounds this link between control over the 
 
44 WILLIAM HOOD, MOLE 29 (WW Norton & Co. 1982); Perry, supra note 35, at 230. 
45 On the philosophical ties of control and moral responsibility, see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 14-16 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); John 
Martin Fischer, Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, 110 ETHICS 93, (1999); John M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of 
Free Will: An Essay in Control, 3 LEGAL THEORY 379, (1998). On more historical accounts of the link between 
control and responsibility, see Randall R. Curren, The Contribution of "Nicomachean Ethics" iii 5 to Aristotle's 
Theory of Responsibility, 6 HIST. OF PHIL. Q. 261, 261 (1989). 
46 For control as grounds for mainly criminal and civil liability for another’s actions, see Joel Feinberg, Collective 
Responsibility, 65 J. OF PHIL. 674, 674-75 (1968). On teachers’ liability towards school students, see Reynolds C. 
Seitz, Legal Responsibility Under Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districts as Regards Negligent Conduct 
Toward Pupils, 15 HASTINGS L. J. 495, 496-97 (1964); For commanders’ responsibility for the actions of their 
subordinates, see Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 573, 573-
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process of choosing with responsibility for the consequences of this process.47  When a person 
does not control his actions, he does not have any alternative course of action. When he acts 
according to one available alternative, absent any other and not due to internal motives, he is 
not making a free choice and, therefore, cannot be deemed responsible for his non-free 
actions.48 He is accordingly not considered responsible for the resulting consequences. 
The proposed argument requires that we maintain a distinction between patterns of 
control according to concepts such as vicarious liability. Indeed, the notion of control does not 
necessarily offer theoretical justification for vicarious liability.49 The status or position of 
specific individuals is the basis of vicarious liability.50 For instance, an employer may be held 
accountable for his employee’s wrongdoing regardless of the employer’s involvement in the 
process of bringing about the wrongdoing.51 Instead, this argument ascribes moral and legal 
responsibility to persons in control of the relations with the acting agent. 
This argument relates to other patterns of responsibility that reflect the actual 
circumstances of the cooperating persons’ relations, such as a duty of person A to care for 
person B. Accordingly, a teacher who exercises a high level of control over a student’s acts 
may be responsible for the resulting consequences, such as when a student causes harm during 
 
75 (1999). In this work, I avoid the need to define the broad and complicated notion of responsibility, which bears 
quite a few forms and meanings. Neither do I suggest a distinction between moral and legal responsibility. In 
principle, this article refers to responsibility in terms of accountability. On the various meanings of responsibility, 
see Kurt Baier, Types of Responsibility, in THE SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITY (Peter A. French ed. 1991). 
47 On the profound relations between free will, control, and moral responsibility, see NOMY ARPALY, MERIT, 
MEANING, AND HUMAN BONDAGE: AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); Robert Merrihew 
Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 PHIL. REV. 3, 11 (1985); Watson, supra note 6; Angela M. Smith, Control, 
Responsibility, and Moral Assessment, 138 PHIL. STUD. 367, 367-68 (2008); Bernard Berofsky, Free will and 
determinism, (1966); SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION (OUP Oxford 2000). 
48 Frankfurt has shown that a person can be responsible even in cases when that person has practically no alternative 
courses of action. For instance, when the only alternative available to that person is the very alternative he desires 
nonetheless. See Frankfurt, supra note 14. 
49 Jason W. Neyers, A Theory of Vicarious Liability, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 287, 292 (2005). Take for instance, 
teacher-student relations. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
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a school trip. The teacher cannot be held accountable if the teacher did not join the trip, as 
would be the case had teachers been exposed to vicarious liability.52 
Losing control over ones’ actions can mitigate or even cancel out responsibility in terms 
of blaming, as in the case of a truck driver whose braking system fails, resulting in a collision. 
Accordingly, control intuitively leads to the simultaneous creation of a responsibility base. 
Imagine the same truck driver, instead of losing his brakes, becomes the victim of a hacker. If 
the hacker remotely controls the truck and knowingly steers the truck into a collision, we 
consider the hacker the responsible party. The moment he gains control over the truck is the 
moment he seizes freedom of choice. Free choice entails moral and hence legal responsibility 
for the consequences of such choice. Gaining control over a person or a situation explains why 
the controlling person could be responsible for the controlled person’s actions or their 
consequences. However, gaining control can also explain why the controlling person should be 
responsible. Controlling a situation justifies ascription of responsibility for the situation’s 
consequences to the controlling person. Frequently, the person who controls a situation also 
controls the creation of entailed risks and the information regarding their optimal 
minimization.53 When handlers recruit agents, they gain a substantial level of control over the 
agent. Just like the hacker who gains control over a truck, the handler gains considerable 
control over the agent’s decision-making process and actions. The handler, therefore, should 
become morally responsible for the actions of the agent and their consequences. 
When it comes to the agent’s level of control and free will, (as opposed to the 
handler’s) the free will paradigm becomes complicated. If the handler controls the agent, does 
 
52 Id. at 292. 
53 In terms of law and economy, the controlling person may be in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis 
that justifies his responsibility. See generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability 
in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972). 
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that mean that the agent cannot be morally responsible for his actions? Is the agent in a similar 
position as a person acting under coercion, duress, or lack of control? A previous article argues 
that most voluntary agents exercise free will in electing to become agents, yet should not be 
considered autonomous.54 The agent may be subject to potential exposure by his handlers. As 
the agent is aware of the potential threat, the agent is de-facto deprived of his freedom to bring 
his clandestine activity to an end. A typical agent has no free exit from being handled. He is, 
therefore, not genuinely autonomous, regardless of him voluntarily accepting the secret role. 
Put differently, recruited intelligence agents are not autonomous because they tend to exhaust 
their freedom when they abdicate their freedom of choice. 
As a high level of autonomy or control may entail a high level of responsibility, from 
the standpoint of the controlling person, the opposite may not be valid. A lack of control does 
not necessarily establish lack of responsibility from the standpoint of the controlled party. For 
instance, a person might act without control due to the influence of drugs. We might still 
consider this person to be responsible for his actions despite his lack of control. For example, if 
this person voluntarily took the drug, knowing that it will lead to loss of control. Harry 
Frankfurt demonstrated that even when a person unknowingly and unintentionally gets himself 
into a situation where he has no alternate course of action, he may still be deemed responsible 
for the consequences of this unavoidable choice. For instance, if that person internally desires 
this same course of action.55 
So far, we demonstrated links between control, free choice, and responsibility. 
However, the free choice paradigm has its challenges. Other theories of responsibility tried to 
address these challenges by disconnecting free choice and responsibility. They raise scenarios 
 
54 Bitton, Intelligence Agents, supra note 1. 
55 Frankfurt, supra note 14. 
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where one may be responsible for X regardless of not exercising free choice concerning X. 56 
However, if control is a factor in free choice and consequently of moral responsibility, does 
that mean that if there are occasions of responsibility absent free choice, then control cannot be 
a marker of responsibility or a responsibility base? Control may remain relevant as a 
responsibility base even regarding some competing accounts of the free-choice paradigm. 
One theory competing with the free-choice paradigm is Meir Dan-Cohen’s proposal of a 
concept of responsibility for one’s self. 57 As the free will paradigm blames X for what he 
chooses to do, Dan-Cohen’s theory views X’s responsibility in terms of who X is. It views the 
complex and dynamic self of X as comprising many aspects, such as X’s body, biography, and 
even X’s young children. Each aspect may serve as a responsibility base. By ascribing 
responsibility to X for the action of X’s young child, we determine the boundaries of X’s self. 
Ascribing responsibility to X, in this case, reflects the view of his child as part of X’s self. In 
other words, the child, being part of X’s self, is therefore a responsibility base. 
When reviewed carefully, the boundaries of the self, suggested as boundaries of moral 
and legal responsibility, are primarily influenced by elements we control. Physical objects and 
persons under our guidance can all serve as constitutive elements of oneself. While Dan- Cohen 
presents his theory as an alternative to the traditional free-will paradigm, it is clear that the self 
is constituted very much by elements that a person largely controls. A person’s body or small 
children are good examples. Being part of oneself, a person’s body or small children are all 
responsibility bases. If person X moves his body and hits person Y, or if X hires a person to hit 
 
56 For example, Frankfurt offers a case of a person A who makes a decision to do X because he thinks X should be 
done without knowing that another person has the power and the will to make sure A does X and only X. In this case, 
A should be responsible for X irrespective of the fact that he can only do X. Id. at 830. 
57 Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992). 
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Y, X is deemed responsible for hitting Y. 58 Whether one looks at the issue of moral and legal 
responsibility through the lens of the traditional free-will paradigm or other approaches, such as 
Dan-Cohen’s, one reaches a similar conclusion. A high level of control of person X over person 
Y grounds X’s responsibility for the consequences of Y’s acts, including consequences to Y. 
Once again, the reference here is to a general notion of responsibility as accountability, without 
definition of its scope or nature. 
According to a traditional free-will approach, the handler is responsible for the 
consequences of the agent’s actions due to the direct control she exercises over the agent’s 
actions.59 In Dan-Cohen’s terms, this control transforms the agent into an extension of the 
handler’s self.60 Similarly, we see a screwdriver as an extension of the technician’s body or a 
pen as an extension of the writer. With the recruitment and increasing control of an agent, the 
agent begins merging into the handler’s self, just like the puppet on a string merges into one 
entity with the puppeteer. 
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING CONTROL AS COOPERATION  
Handling relationships are a unique joint activity. It is a kind of cooperative 
relationship, as handler and agent perform various tasks together. Such tasks cannot be 
completed unless both parties cooperate. For instance, a joint task could be to collect data D 
from point P in time T. Another example would be the joint task of secretly placing object O in 
point P in time T. 
Cooperation always entails concessions about preferences and entails prior consent, 
 
58 Dan-Cohen’s theory of responsibility allows responsibility for elements included within the self of X with regard 
to which X does not necessarily exercise control. Such are, for example, the cases of moral luck and events 
incorporated into X’s biography, irrespective of not being under the control of X. However, even according to Dan-
Cohen, most of the responsibility bases of oneself are elements that are in one’s control. Id.  
59 See id. 
60 See id.  
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whether voluntary or coerced, to a particular joint action.61 Handler and agent must coordinate 
time, location, and method of operation.62 Unless the persons cooperating are entirely in 
agreement with regard to preferences, such agreement on time, location, and method must 
involve some concession of at least one party. To place object O in point P in time T, agent and 
the handler must first decide to perform the task. Subsequently, they need to decide on the 
manner of performing the task, including, for instance, the time and place. Assuming that both 
handler and agent need to bridge different preferences about what tasks to perform and how to 
perform them, one needs to ask: how do they do it? Had the agent and handler been engaged in 
a mutual and relatively equal relationship, they could have established cooperation through 
mutual concessions. For example, the handler and agent could agree on the four relevant 
parameters (the task, the object, the time, and the place) by way of compromise.63 However, 
handler-agent relationships are typically asymmetrical, not equal or mutual. In typically mutual 
and equal relationships between X and Y, X does not recruit Y. Moreover, in friendly 
relationships, X does not control or handle Y. Recall that handling requires a high level of 
control over the agent. It is, therefore, the handler that determines tasks. The handler instructs 
the agent about the time, place, and manner of their performance. This means that the agent 
typically enables cooperation through concessions when adapting a task and its implementation 
parameters. The agent simply performs the tasks that the handler sets. He must perform these 
tasks according to the handler’s performance parameters. Cooperation is enabled by the agent 
 
61 Cooperation, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cooperation (last 
visited April 19, 2021) (defining ‘cooperation’ as: “the act of working together with someone or doing what they ask 
you”). 
62 ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION 40–66 (Phillip W. Anderson, et al., eds., 1997); Robert Axelrod & William Donald Hamilton, The 
Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390 (1981); Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, Modeling Strong Reciprocity, 
in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 193 
(2005). 
63 They could, in theory, mutually adopt some third option with regards to one or more of the parameters. 
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accepting the handler’s instructions. The grounds of the agent’s acceptance require analysis. 
Acceptance or consent, in theory, could be voluntary. In such a case, X accepts Y’s 
instructions and preferences because X wants to accept them. X accepts Y’s instruction only 
because X wants to accept these instructions and not because he must accept them. X’s 
concessions, however, could be the result of compulsion or authority. In such a case, X allows 
some control over X’s preferences and actions to Y because Y exercises some authority over X. 
Y has some actual or potential coercive means that drive X’s subjection. 
Voluntary concession of control in cooperative relations is quite common. Friendship 
and marriage are good examples of voluntary concession, which may result from the social 
nature of these relations. A marriage’s nature may lead partner X to allow his partner Y to 
determine what to do tomorrow and how to do it even if X prefers to do something else. X 
voluntarily agrees to act based on Y’s preferences. The day after, X and Y’s partnership may 
lead Y to reciprocate. 
Involuntary concession of control within cooperative relations is also quite common. 
For instance, commander-soldier relationships or manager-employee relationships match this 
pattern. Authority and sanctions of various types and measures are the grounds of involuntary 
control in these cooperative relationships. For example, orders in the army and their 
enforcement mechanisms guarantee soldiers’ cooperation. The potential sanction of dismissal 
in employment relationships may also be grounds of involuntary control. Fear of sanction leads 
the soldier or the employee to hand cooperative control over to the commander or manager, 
respectively. 
It might seem inconsistent to speak of cooperation between two persons X and Y when 
only Y accepts X’s instructions due to X’s coercive powers. It sounds as inconsistent as saying 
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that the slave cooperates with his master. Similarly, some references to cooperation exclude 
coercion. For instance, when Goldsmith and Posner explain the creation of customary law, they 
differentiate between cooperation and coercion.64 They explicitly refer to a pattern of 
cooperation by excluding cases where two states follow a rule due to state X coercing state Y to 
follow the rule.65 In contrast, in organizational theory, trust and authority are frequently 
grounds of cooperation.66 Both trust and authority largely parallel the voluntary and coercive 
grounds of control to which this article refers. According to this approach, joint activity 
resulting from authority remains within the boundaries of cooperation. 
The definition of cooperation for the sake of this argument is as follows: person X and 
person Y are in a cooperative relationship if they both invest time and energy in an attempt to 
perform an agreed task that has predefined performance parameters of time, place, and manner. 
The parameters for the joint operation may be agreed upon or forced upon any of the parties. 
The definition should be, therefore, treated as value neutral. The task might be horrible and so 
might be the means that X applies in leading Y to cooperate. Still, if Y performs and takes a 
share of the task, X and Y engage in cooperation according to this article’s definition. Actually, 
in a bad movie, when the interrogator steps into the interrogation room, he typically makes a 
“friendly” offer to the suspect: “will you cooperate with us?” The suspect’s assistance is called 
cooperation, although entirely involuntary. Therefore, the focal point of the proposed definition 
of cooperation is the task carried out using the energy or capabilities of two or more 
 
64 Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1123-27 
(1999), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234136256.pdf.  
65 Id.  
66 In the literature on organizational theory there is a debate about the sources of cooperation and the desirability of 
each of its sources. Instead of voluntary and involuntary sources of control, it is named authority or trust, 
respectively. See Katinka Bijlsma-Frankema & Ana Cristina Costa, Understanding The Trust-Control Nexus, 20 
INT’L SOCIO. 259, 266-69 (2005). 
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cooperating parties. The motives and the means, in this regard, are irrelevant to the question if 
A and B cooperate. 
The grounds of and power to control, whether voluntary or forced, seem mostly 
exclusive to one another. In cases where sources of cooperation are voluntary, compulsory 
control seems unnecessary and hence typically absent. The opposite case seems similarly 
reasonable. In cases where the cooperating party establishes control through involuntary means, 
the cooperative parties are usually in a conflict that leaves no room for voluntary sources of 
control. A prison is an extreme example of involuntary cooperative relationships. The prisoner 
cooperates with his guard. However, he only cooperates due to the guard’s nearly absolute 
control, achieved mostly through authority and the power of sanctions. In such relationships, 
for both practical and probable emotional reasons, there is neither need nor possibility of 
cooperation based on voluntary choice. 
In contrast, in a scouting youth group, a child cooperates with his instructor; however, 
the child seems to accept the instructor’s authority voluntarily.67 Therefore, these cooperative 
relationships hardly use any compulsory sources of control. Even if compulsion had been 
relevant to such relationships, it is practically unnecessary. Moreover, in reciprocal or friendly 
relationships, demonstrating mutual trust and closeness seem to be primary sources and 
motives for concessions. When X accepts his friend Y’s proposal, X accepts it partly because X 
does not have to accept it. If X realizes that Y asks him to do something because he thinks that 
he has some authority over X, this understanding in itself might motivate X not to accept the 
proposal. Once coercion finds itself in X’s relationship with his friend, X realizes that this is 
 
67 The film G.I. Jane offers a good example. Trainees of the Navy SEALS allow full control over their actions to the 
sergeant. However, all they need to do to regain control over their actions is to step into the center of the yard and 
ring a bell. 
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probably not a friendly relationship anymore. 
At this point, it is crucial to clarify the exclusionary nature of coercive and voluntary 
grounds of control. When the cooperating persons establish control through coercion, voluntary 
elements vastly diminish but do not necessarily disappear. As one person is coerced to hand 
over control of his preferences and actions, some voluntary elements may still exist, although 
probably very weakly. For example, prisoner-guard cooperative relationships are primarily 
coercive. The prisoner cooperates because he has to, but that does not mean that the prisoner’s 
cooperation with the guard is fully coerced. The prisoner may cooperate with the guard and 
participate in some social activity in prison out of his own will.68 However, his will remains a 
very marginal aspect of prisoner-guard cooperation. As a result, the argument that coercion and 
voluntary grounds of control are mutually exclusive means that one practically excludes the 
other in such a manner that when one exists, the other diminishes dramatically, although not 
necessarily to zero. 
In summary, one of the markers or elements of cooperation is concession. When X 
cooperates with Y, it entails the surrendering of some of X’s preferences to Y.69 X’s abdication 
 
68 See, e.g., Christina Capatides, Six Inmates Who Saved Guard’s Life Rewarded with Shorter Sentences, CBS NEWS 
(June 23, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/six-inmates-who-saved-guards-life-rewarded-with-
shorter-sentences/. 
69 It should be clarified that for A to cooperate with B, A does not necessarily give up his personal autonomy. A (or 
B) should, however, give up on some of its preferences, or at the very least, have a higher priority for B’s 
preferences. A voluntary concession concerning some of A’s free will does not necessarily undermine A’s personal 
autonomy. For the primary two mostly parallel hierarchical models, see Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and 
the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971); Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, 12 GRAZER 
PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN  203 (1981) (Austria); and Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action, 8 
CANADIAN J. PHIL. 211 (1978). For Frankfurt’s more recent improvement of the hierarchical model, see Harry 
Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS 
IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (1987). For Dworkin’s account, see Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (1976). For three more recent and promising developments of the hierarchical model, 
see John Christman, Defending Historical Autonomy: A Reply to Professor Mele, 23 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 281, 
286-88 (1993); Michael E. Bratman, Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason, PHIL. TOPICS, Fall 1996, at 
1, 2-4 (1996); Laura Waddell Ekstrom, A Coherence Theory of Autonomy, 53 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RSCH. 599, 614-15 (1993). For a comprehensive summary of the evolution of the hierarchical models, see James 
Stacey Taylor, Introduction, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY: NEW ESSAYS ON PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS ROLE IN 
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of preferences is the result either of voluntary concession or coercion and authority. X may be 
willing to concede some of his preferences for the sake of cooperation. Alternatively, Y might 
force X into handing over some of his freedom in order to enable cooperation with Y. These 
sources of control (volition or compulsion) are typically exclusive. When one is applied, the 
other diminishes almost entirely and most likely is not necessary. 
This insight leads to the unique aspect of controlling an intelligence agent. The handler 
establishes these cooperative relationships based on both grounds of control, voluntary and 
involuntary simultaneously. In an atypical combination, the voluntary and involuntary control 
sources in handling do not exclude one another. In handling an agent, good relationships and 
authority uniquely co-exist. Although relatively rare, the co-existence of voluntary and 
involuntary grounds of control appears in other types of cooperative relationships. For instance, 
in certain stages, parenthood entails control over a child, partly through coercion and partly by 
consent. 
V. VOLUNTARY AND COERCIVE CONTROL IN HANDLING AN AGENT  
The voluntary grounds of control in handling relationships depend upon the handler’s 
ability to create trust and personal relationships with the agent. The agent is expected to 
develop a personal sense of commitment to the handler. In many cases, as mentioned above, 
the agent would be a volunteer and, therefore, initially willing to be subjected to the handler’s 
control. But the co-existing involuntary element of control calls for an explanation. 
Even in cases of clear voluntary handling relationships, authority and compulsion 
always hover over the relationship. Once the agent’s cooperation is evident, the agent has 
crossed the line of no return. From this point in time, the handler holds the weapon of the 
 
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 1-29 (2005). For an amendment and application of the hierarchical model 
in the handler-agent case, see Bitton, Intelligence Agents, supra note 1. 
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agent’s potential exposure. The agent is now vulnerable to extortion and may fear a harmful 
response if he stops cooperating.70 The agent is exceptionally vulnerable and exposed to his 
handler’s potential shift into a non-friendly mode of action. Once recruited, he is at the 
handler’s mercy. Harming an agent is usually not in the interest of the employing state. 
However, the fear is always there, nevertheless. Due to the extreme risk, a rational agent will 
take it into serious account, irrespective of its low probability. Marcus Klingberg, who spied for 
the KGB against Israel, described the combination of voluntary and involuntary elements of 
handling in chillingly vivid terms: 
I quickly analyzed the situation. If I refuse, I am taking the risk of bringing the 
situation to boiling temperature. They may give up. May not insist. And maybe 
they will not. Maybe they will not give up . . . The presumption behind these 
relations was that they are voluntarily established and hence their strength. Not 
once, the question of “what if” crossed my mind. What if I wish to quit? That I 
could quit just the way I joined . . . Actually, it was the first time where for a 
second, I raised in my mind the option of the Russians moving to the level of 
extortion. However, I immediately rejected it. It was obviously the worst 
alternative. At least this way, when we maintain voluntary relations, there is 
respect and appreciation, and the meetings could be conducted in good spirit. The 
move to a different level of relations will have enormous consequences. The 
 
70 See, for example, the case of Marwan Ashraf as a typical example of the grounds for concerns of agents. Ashraf, 
one of the most senior recruited agents ever operated within the leadership of an Arab country, served as an agent 
for the Mossad from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. Following his exposure after many years as an ex-agent of 
Israel, he was mysteriously found dead after falling from his apartment balcony in London. One of the speculations 
was that the Mossad had “unfinished business,” and dealt with Ashraf violently. As irrational as this speculation 
sounds, due to secrecy and natural temptation for conspiracy theories on these matters, such stories reflect a 
potential concern to any recruited agent. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Intelligence Chief Who Went Fishing in the Cold: How 
Maj. Gen.(res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel's Best Source Ever, 23 INTEL. AND NAT’L SEC. 226, 226-27 
(2008). 
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voluntary relations leave some flexibility on my end . . . No. I decided I will not 
refuse. The relations with the Russians must not turn into coercion.71  
The combined voluntary and coercive grounds and their unique co-existence create an 
exceptionally high degree of control. If the level of responsibility is linked to the level of 
control, and the level of control is exceptionally high due to its dual-source, then the 
responsibility for handling relationships may very well be exceptionally high. 
One may wonder why the aggregation of two combined grounds of control should be 
necessarily more potent than one alone. Consider control in handling relationships generated on 
both voluntary grounds, V, and coercive grounds, C, and there exists another type of 
cooperative relationship in which only one ground applies, based on voluntary willingness. Let 
control power in this case be marked T.72 The handler’s total control is potent because, in 
handling, both sources of control co-exist in an exceptional manner. Returning to our example, 
why should T  < V + C necessarily be correct? T may be mighty and, consequently, may exceed V + 
C, nonetheless. In theory, T may indeed be that powerful in comparison to the dual-grounded 
control in handling. In practice, this is supposed to be very rare, if practical at all. The reason is 
that both grounds of control in handling, in our case, each of V and C alone, are exceptionally 
high. The coercive grounds entail the threat of a long prison sentence or even death.73 In many 
cases, it might put the agent’s family at a similar risk.74 One can hardly think of a more 
powerful coercion. The voluntary grounds of control are similarly potent. Handling usually 
 
71 MA KLINGBERG & MICHAEL SFARD, HAMERAGEL HA'AHARON [The Last Spy] 224-25 (2007) (Isr.). 
72Recall that relationships in which control is based purely on one ground (voluntary or coercive) is hardly possible. 
In most cases, the “absent” ground is not absent, but dramatically diminished. When I refer to cases of “one ground 
of control only,” I refer to these cases. Namely, I refer to situations where one source of control is exceptionally 
dominant over the other. 
73 See Kilian, supra note 36. 
74 See Brendan Cole, CIA Spy and His Family Extracted from Russia are in Danger for the Rest of Their Lives, Says 
Friend of Murdered Ex-FSB Whistleblower, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2019, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-spy-felshtinsky-smolenkov-putin-1458929. 
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requires the transformation of an adversary into a partner. The level of commitment and 
willingness, amidst terrifying risks, must be at the top end of personal commitment. The result 
is, therefore, distinct. Both grounds of control in handling, coercive and voluntary, are each 
potent on their own. Considering their rare co-existence leads to the conclusion that control in 
handling is more compelling than in most cooperative relationships. 
Relationships in which both sources of control co-exist are exceedingly rare. For 
instance, voluntary and involuntary grounds of control co-exist in parent-child relationships.75 
Similarly, commander-subordinate team relationships in elite military units or teacher-student 
relationships, may feature this pattern. In some cases, religious leaders and members of their 
congregations may demonstrate dual grounds of control. These examples suggest that agent-
handler relationships belong to a particular category of significant and influential relationships. 
These relationships extend far beyond control over one’s actions for both the 
controlling and the controlled persons, as far as being a constitutive element in oneself. As 
such, and in Dan-Cohen’s terms, these strong relationships reshape the controlling self’s 
boundaries.76 They are, therefore, an aspect in the handler’s self that constitutes a responsibility 
base. 
There obtains a significant difference between responsibility for an event and 
responsibility for a person. In similar, but not identical terms, Dan-Cohen defines these two 
types of responsibilities as object-responsibility and subject-responsibility.77 The dual-ground 
control of the agent by the handler constitutes responsibility for the agent as a person. It is a 
particularly wide-ranging type of responsibility, including for events, although indirectly. The 
 
75 See generally Cole, supra note 74.  
76 Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, supra note 57, at 970. 
77 See id. 
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handler may be responsible for an event initiated by the agent because he is responsible, as a 
whole, for the agent’s actions. He may be responsible even for events of which he was unaware 
that the agent was setting in motion. Similarly, a parent may be unknowingly responsible for 
events initiated by his child and, at times, even unwillingly.78 Accordingly, if an agent in the 
field takes an undesired action as part of his activity, the handler may be responsible for this 
action’s consequences, although he did not order it. 
Understanding the unique nature of control in handling relationships may help tackle 
some of the moral and legal issues involved in running agents. For example, “Role Distance” 
involves a familiar exemption of civil servants from personal responsibility for their state- 
sponsored conduct.79 Dan-Cohen illustrates this concept with the extreme example of the 
executioner, whom we do not hold responsible for his act of killing a person sentenced to 
death.80 
One way of presenting this exemption is through the concept of defense in criminal law. 
One such defense is the exemption of a civil servant based on the Execution of Public Duty.81 
According to Dan-Cohen, the executioner does not require a defense or a justification, as he 
bears no responsibility in the first place.82 The executioner follows salient formal and 
ceremonial protocol. He wears a uniform and hides his face behind a mask, thereby distancing 
himself from the act.83 These methods clarify that the person behind the mask is not involved. 
 
78 This conclusion is, in part, because the parent controls the child’s environment. This control is the source of 
responsibility for the child’s unknown actions because, based on this control, the parent should have been aware of 
the child’s actions, and should be responsible for their consequences. 
79 MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 233-35 (2002). 
80 Id. at 233.  
81 On the criminal defense of lawful capacity of duty or Execution of Public Duty, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.03. 
For a comparative analysis of this defense, see Paul H. Robinson, et al., The American Criminal Code: General 
Defenses, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 37 (2015). 
82 DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS, supra note 79. 
83 Id. 
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An uninvolved person cannot bear any personal responsibility for an act.84 The act of killing is 
“external” to the self of the executioner. In Dan-Cohen’s formula of responsibility, the 
executioner’s act falls outside the boundaries of his self.85 The act thus falls outside his range of 
personal responsibility. 
The handler should be similarly exempted from personal liability for handling. After all, 
the handler is a civil servant who should not bear personal responsibility for his acts within his 
duty. However, analysis of the kind of control the handler exercises might suggest the handler 
should be treated differently. Unlike the executioner, the handler goes out of her way to 
maintain a personal relationship with the agent. Formalities are pushed aside, and an effort is 
made to create an atmosphere of trust and personal commitment.86  
The concept of Role Distance, which is supposed to serve as a defense for the handler, 
or render a defense unnecessary, seems to produce contradicting results.87 The concept of Role 
Distance exempts X from responsibility for Y, provided Y was clearly and noticeably carried out 
within X’s job or as part of X’s role. As Goffman suggests, the ceremonial aspects signal that 
when performing Y, it is not the person X who performs Y.88 It is instead Xc, the civil servant in 




86 See HCJ 3648/06 Pollard v. Acting Prime Minister (“[W]ithin all the arguments presented by the plaintiffs as 
proven facts, they have also indicated that respondent 4 [Raphael Eitan, the Chief of Lakam and Chief Handler of 
Pollard] had not been operating on his own, but rather operated on behalf of the Government of Israel. If this is the 
case, it follows that no personal and exclusive responsibility should be ascribed to him as argued . . . .” (quoting 
Chief Justice Beinish)) (unpublished) (on file with author) (Isr.). Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice Beinish may 
have taken for granted the concept of Role Distance as a defense for a handler. Beinish dismissed Pollard’s appeal 
against the appointment of his senior handler as a minister. Beinish argued that even if all of Pollard’s accusations 
against the handler were correct, the handler should bear no personal responsibility, as he acted on behalf of the 
government of Israel in exercising his official duties. However, as I have suggested, a significant portion of the 
handler’s control is obtained through personal rather than formal sources of cooperation, and the defense of Role 
Distance may not be that trivial in this case. 
87See DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS, supra note 79. 
88 See id.  
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and informal patterns of conduct interchangeably. The handler may be at times friendly and 
strict, threatening and supportive, friendly and commanding, caring and warning, giving and 
taking. The concept of Role Distance simply cannot guide us within this inconsistency. 
Similarly, when a parent is strict with his child, the parent still acts as the child’s parent. 
However, as being kind and supportive is also part of parenthood, both forms of parental 
behavior belong to parenting. Like a parent, it is clear that the handler acts within his role when 
he behaves informally with the agent. Moreover, the agent knows that the informal aspects of 
handling are indeed part of the handling and an unmistakable part of the handler’s role. As a 
result, the concept of Role Distance does not help determine responsibility in handler-agent 
relations. As the concept of role distance is based on formalities marking conduct as part of the 
role, it cannot produce reliable results concerning a role that, by definition, includes informal 
aspects.89 
In contrast, the concept of responsibility in terms of cooperation and control may help 
determine the scope of the handler’s responsibility. The handler has more control over handling 
than the executioner holds over the execution process. As opposed to the concept of Role 
Distance, through the notion of control, the formalities involved in performing the 
executioner’s role do not express “this is not personal.”90 Instead, they are a sign of a lack of 
control over the process. Protocols are set, so people follow them, namely, to take control of 
the hands of those who are performing within the boundaries set by protocol. 
If the executioner deviates from protocol, he will be responsible for the killing. He will 
be responsible if he kills the convicted person a night before or with a sword rather than a lethal 
 
89 At least, it cannot lead to the conclusion that Cheif Justice Beinish was wrong in ascribing a Role Distance 
defense to Eitan. 
90 See DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS, supra note 79, at 234–35.  
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injection. Deviating from protocol indicates control, and this, in turn, implies responsibility. In 
sheer contrast to the executioner, the handler largely controls the process of recruiting and 
handling the agent. The centrality of informality does not suggest that the relationships are 
impersonal, as Role Distance may suggest. Rather, it indicates that the handler largely controls 
the process. Although he follows orders from his superiors, the task of handling is, to no small 
extent, under his control. 
A. Control as a marker of responsibility in handling 
The idea of dual-ground control can guide us in analyzing additional moral and legal 
issues concerning handling. As mentioned, responsibility for the agent’s wellbeing and the 
consequences of his activity is a broad notion. At first glance, it seems vague.91 One of the 
reasons for the unclarity is the many faces of responsibility and the many questions involved. It 
is unclear when a handler or a state is responsible for damages or consequences occurring 
during or due to the handling. Even when a handler’s or state’s responsibility is determined, the 
scope of remedies is unclear. For how long will the state be responsible? Is the state responsible 
for the agent’s family? What types of harm should the state cover? It is also unclear what types 
of responsibility can be and should be ascribed to the handler at both legal and moral levels. 
This article cannot offer a complete account of such a notion of responsibility. The legal 
doctrine of responsibility in each case may be different concerning different states and 
contexts. However, the notion of dual-ground control offers a framework for the theoretical 
analysis that underpins such doctrine. 
B. Control and temporal aspects of responsibility 
 
91 On the complexity of the concept of responsibility, see Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 
75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 12–16 (1994); Watson, supra note 6; Dana K Nelkin, Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions 
about Moral Responsibility? 31 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 243, 243–45 (2007); Marina Oshana, Ascriptions of 
Responsibility, 34 AM. PHIL. Q. 71, 71–76 (1997). 
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As the level of control might indicate the degree and range of a handler’s responsibility, 
a dramatic shift in control could indicate a dramatic shift in responsibility towards the agent. If 
control is a marker of responsibility, one needs to identify when control is established and the 
point in time when control is diminished or completely lost. These points may indicate the 
establishment of responsibility. As recruitment does not succeed before the handler gains 
profound control, identifying the starting point in responsibility is a relatively simple task.92 It 
is typically more complicated to identify the points in time when control is lost. 
There are various ways for a handler to lose control of his agent. For instance, when the 
agent wishes to cease engaging in risky operations. Alternatively, when the agent’s services are 
no longer necessary. Control is also lost when the agent deviates heavily from his framework of 
instructions, and thus goes rogue. The clearest example is when an agent turns into a double- 
agent. Once a double-agent, the agent’s handlers no longer exercise control over him. A 
double-agent can reverse the scenario and potentially gain some control over his handler.93 A 
less clear example is when the agent becomes undisciplined and takes independent initiatives 
that are either forbidden or clearly outside his activities’ scope. For instance, when an agent is 
warned not to perform x as part of his activity and performs x nonetheless.94 
C. Control and the scope of responsibility 
 
92 Bitton, Intelligence Agents, supra note 1. 
93 The double agent may be responsible for the consequences of his manipulative control over his handler. However, 
under these conditions, he exercises a weaker control over the handler compared to typical control of a handler over 
an agent. The double agent, for instance, is not capable of using the exposure threat. 
94 One helpful test for determining control over X would be the test of an alternative path. If the handler could have 
influenced events so that the agent had performed Y (and if the handler wanted X), it only makes sense to view X as 
an event caused under the control of the handler. Responsibility for handling is based on control, but it should be 
sensitive to the temporal context of control. Control should be measured at the right point in time. The test of control 
over the agent’s actions refers to the point in time when the agent made his choices and acted. For instance, an agent 
can be arrested five years after he ceased his operations. At this point, the handler exercises zero control over the 
agent. But this does not negate the handler’s responsibility, for this is not the point in time that matters. What 
matters is what actions of the agent led to his arrest, and more importantly, if the agent took these actions in the past 
and under the control of the handler. 
RETHINKING RESPONSIBILITY AS COOPERATION AND CONTROL  
 
33 
A handler may be responsible for the financial consequences of the handling. Naturally, 
and for many reasons, the employing state will most likely bear this cost.95 Financial 
consequences vary greatly. Different agents suffer different losses. Each element of the 
financial aspects, even regarding the same agent, may vary broadly. For instance, the 
employing state may decide to pay the agent a monthly stipend to cover his income loss once 
exposed. Even the level of this one aspect of responsibility may vary. In fulfillment of its 
responsibility, the employing state can always pay the agent a higher amount and for a more 
extended period. The marker of control may assist in determining the scope of responsibility in 
such cases. The scope of responsibility correlates with the scope of control over the agent. For 
instance, as the handling lasts longer and directs the agent towards more dangerous tasks, 
responsibility should rise accordingly. In this respect, the duration of handling and the 
associated risks are markers of control that, in turn, is a marker of responsibility.96  
At first glance, responsibility is not a dichotomous notion, but a range. We are, 
therefore, occupied with two questions concerning responsibility. We are first interested in 
determining if X is responsible for Y. We are then interested in determining to what extent X is 
responsible for Y. The notion of control similarly reflects a range. As control is a marker of 
responsibility in handling, the level of the handler’s control over the agent may be a marker of 
 
95 The employing state enjoys the products of handling; the handler does not, at least not directly. At times, the 
handler even risks his own life in the process, but the states typically assume the liability ascribed to its employees 
while acting within their role. Another division of risk would become inefficient in addition to being unjust, and 
handlers will not take the job if it carries such substantial financial risks. 
96 For instance, the Israeli government has defined standards for measuring the level of responsibility towards 
“burned” agents. The Israeli government’s criteria rest on the duration of operations, the associated risk, the 
contribution of the operations to Israel’s security, and the intensity of the operations. These are all markers of 
control. Bringing an agent to a long service or leading him to intense or risky service requires a high level of control 
over the agent. Naturally, for the handler to manage to convince the agent to operate for a longer time or under 
higher risk, the handler needs a greater level of control. See Resolution 118 of the Government of Israel (13 Jan. 
1994); HCJ 5499/95 Jaber Aref v. The Prime Minister of Israel; HCJ 2221/99 Plonim v. The Prime Minister of 
Israel. On the Israeli policy of responsibility for “burned” agents and human sources, see Menachem Hofnong, The 
Price of Information: Reception and Rehabilitation of The Security System’s Collaborators in the Cities of Israel, 18 
LAW AND GOVERNANCE 55 (2017) (Isr.). 
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the scope of the handler’s responsibility. The higher the level of control over the agent, the 
higher the responsibility for the handling. There is always a critical mass of control below 
which the handler, although exercising some level of control, can no longer be responsible. 
In contrast, in moral and legal discourse, control typically serves as a dichotomous parameter. 
The moral agent either is or is not in control when acting. Once exceeding a certain critical 
mass of control, responsibility is determined, and the level of control seems not to play a role 
any further. In contrast, this article argues that control is not merely a marker of responsibility 
but also a marker for the scope of responsibility. Have we reached a contradiction? 
The level of control does not determine the level of responsibility but rather the range 
of responsibility. According to conventional and intuitive moral and legal thinking, we perceive 
control as a dichotomous parameter. For instance, for person A to be responsible for event X, A 
needs to exercise a critical level of control over the event (C). One indication of such control is 
A’s will and ability to have acted differently. If C crosses some predefined critical mass, then A 
is considered responsible for X. If C is even higher, it does not change this conclusion, for a 
person is not responsible and then even more responsible for an event. A person is either 
responsible or not. Recall that this paper argues that the level of control over the agent dictates 
the level of responsibility. It should lead to the conclusion that more control equals more 
responsibility. This conclusion seems to contradict the conventional dichotomous nature of 
responsibility. But it does not. 
Responsibility for a person is a range-based parameter, as opposed to the dichotomous 
responsibility for an event. Responsibility is a dual-phase range of both the aspects for which 
one is responsible and the magnitude of responsibility concerning each aspect. A parent is 
responsible for his very young child. The primary connection to his child entails responsibility 
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for certain events caused by his child and for specific duties towards his child. Responsibility 
for a person is context-based. For instance, a parent is responsible for a broader range of events 
and duties concerning his child than the child’s teacher. Yet the teacher seems to have a higher 
degree of responsibility concerning the same child compared to a neighbor. 
This article suggests control is the differentiating factor concerning the degree of 
aspects and duties for which one is responsible concerning another person. The level of control 
can also guide us regarding the magnitude of each duty. The level of control does seem to 
correlate to the range of responsibility concerning each duty. If this is the case, then this 
article’s argument does not deviate from conventional moral thinking. It only offers a rationale 
to explain it. For instance, once a person reaches a critical level of control over an event R1, that 
person may be 100% responsible for R1.97 In principle, more control over event R1 will not 
involve more responsibility for R1. A more extensive level of control concerning a person and 
not a particular event will lead to a broader range of duties towards the controlled person, like 
R2, R3, … Rn.98 The responsibility I address in this paper is mainly the responsibility of the 
handler to the agent in general and not for specific events that the agent initiates or specific 
duties towards the agent. Accordingly, a high level of control is a marker of profound 
responsibility towards the agent as a person. It means more duties towards the agent. 
Furthermore, it means that each one of these duties is a relatively strong one. 
D. Control and other considerations 
The notion of dual-ground control helps explain the level of the handler’s and 
employing state’s responsibility. What stops us from making a definitive conclusion about the 
actual level of responsibility towards the agent is the understanding that it is only one out of 
 
97 In this example, I assume that each event is the result of one, and only one, different aspect of responsibility. 
98 Inevitably, a more comprehensive range of responsibility may indicate more bases of control. It may also mean a 
more profound responsibility for a particular responsibility base. 
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many considerations in handling. Other considerations may be relevant. Some may support 
more profound responsibility towards the agent, like the need to incentivize future agents. 
Some considerations might support demoting the level of responsibility, such as an agent’s bad 
conduct after termination of his services. This paper offers a clearer understanding of the level 
of responsibility towards the agent, assuming all other considerations are absent. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Relationships of handling in intelligence are exceptional in almost every sense. This 
paper argues that one exceptional parameter is the handler’s level of control over the agent. 
This control is unique due to its dual-grounds pattern. It is the combination of both coercive 
and voluntary grounds of control. As these grounds are typically mutually exclusive, their co-
existence in handling is unique. In this regard, handling resembles patterns of relationships, 
such as parenthood during childhood. This paper offers a link between control and 
responsibility. In the proposed argument, responsibility refers to a person rather than to specific 
events or duties. As control is exceptionally potent in handling, this paper argues for a 
relatively high level of commitment towards agents by their handlers. Moreover, as control is a 
marker of responsibility, gaining and losing control serves to establish or waive responsibility. 
An argument for a deep commitment of handlers to agents is insufficient for answering the 
needs of practical guidance of handling. For other than responsibility for the agent’s wellbeing, 
handling involves other considerations, some of which may compete with a handler’s 
commitment towards the agent. The eventual and specific practical guidance must result from 
balancing these duties together. 
The next phase of research should be the slow construction of this guidance. It should 
target the construction of a more detailed framework of proper treatment of agents. In this 
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formula, as mentioned, the moral responsibility towards the agent is just one, although a 
significant building block. Such a formula may be the basis of internal orders for handling. 
Furthermore, it may be the basis for statutory regulation of handling. Irrespective of the exact 
normative framework, it will be based on one important principle: the desire to control comes 
with a duty. The more significant the control, the more significant the duty. 
